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We study the EPR-type correlations from the perspective of the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics. We
argue that these correlations do not entail any form of “non-locality”, when viewed in the context of this interpretation.
The abandonment of strict Einstein realism implied by the relational stance permits to reconcile quantum mechanics,
completeness, (operationally defined) separability, and locality.
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1 Introduction
EPR-type experiments, championed by Aspect et al.
[1, 2], are often interpreted as empirical evidence for
the existence of a somewhat mysterious “quantum non-
locality”. For instance, Chris Isham concludes his beau-
tiful exposition of the EPR debate with the words “[...]
we are obliged either to stick to a pragmatic approach
or strict instrumentalist interpretation, or else to accept
the existence of a strange non-locality that seems hard
to reconcile with our normal concepts of spatial separa-
tion between independent entities” [3]. In spite of seven
decades of reflection on this problem, leading to consider-
able sharpening in its characterization [4, 5], the precise
nature of this non-locality —which does not appear to
be usable to transmit information, nor does make quan-
tum theory incompatible with special relativity— remains
rather elusive.
In recent years, a novel point of view on quantum the-
ory, denoted Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM), has
been discussed by some authors [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. In
this paper, we argue that in the context of this interpreta-
tion, it is not necessary to abandon locality in order to ac-
count for EPR correlations. From the relational perspec-
tive, the apparent “quantum non-locality” is a mistaken
illusion caused by the error of disregarding the quantum
nature of all physical systems.
The price for saving locality is the weakening of realism
which is at the core of RQM. This ontological move, as
radical as it may appear at first sight, is actually implicit
in the historical evolution of the EPR debate.
In the original 1935 article [13], the EPR argument was
conceived as an attack against the description of measure-
ments in Copenhagen quantum theory, and a criticism of
the idea that Copenhagen QM could be a complete de-
scription of reality. Locality and a strong form of realism
were given for granted by EPR, and completeness was ar-
gued to be incompatible with quantum-mechanical predic-
tions.
With Bell’s contribution [15], which showed that EPR
correlations are incompatible with the existence of a hy-
pothetical complete local realist theory, the argument has
been mostly reinterpreted as a direct challenge to “local
realism”. Proofs of non-locality have been then developed
by a number of other authors, using increasingly weaker
assumptions ([4, 5], and references therein), in particular,
dropping the need of assuming the existence of a hidden–
variable theory.
On the other hand, the Kochen-Specker theorem [16]
has questioned the very possibility of uncritically ascribing
“properties” to a quantum system. From this perspective,
the problem of locality moves to the background, replaced
by a mounting critique of strongly objective notions of
reality (see for instance [17]). Here we take this conceptual
evolution to what appears to us to be its necessary arriving
point: the possibility of reading EPR-type experiments
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as a challenge to Einstein’s strong realism, rather than
locality.
To be sure, the philosophical implications of RQM, es-
pecially for what concerns realism, are heavy1. We shall
briefly comment on these in Sec 4.4. However, the purpose
of this paper is not to defend explicitly the relational in-
terpretation of quantum theory, but only to remark that,
if one adopts this view, the disturbing non-local features
of EPR-like correlations disappear.
Similar criticisms to the notion of “quantum non-
locality” have been recently expressed by a number of
authors [19, 20, 21, 22]. In particular, in a recent arti-
cle [23], Asher Peres concludes his analysis of the EPR
problem with a general statement, which, as we shall see
below, is precisely the ground assumption of RQM. Thus,
if we are inclined to accept RQM as a way to make sense of
quantum theory, the EPR correlations can be interpreted
as supporting this point of view.
2 Relational quantum mechanics,
locality and separability
The relational approach claims that a number of confusing
puzzles raised by Quantum Mechanics (QM) result from
the unjustified use of the notion of objective, absolute,
‘state’ of a physical system, or from the notion of absolute,
real, ‘event’.
The way out from the confusion suggested by RQM con-
sists in acknowledging that different observers can give dif-
ferent accounts of the actuality of the same physical prop-
erty [6]. This fact implies that the occurrence of an event
is not something absolutely real or not, but it is only real
in relation to a specific observer. Notice that, in this con-
text, an observer can be any physical system.
Thus, the central idea of RQM is to apply Bohr and
Heisenberg’s key intuition that “no phenomenon is a phe-
nomenon until it is an observed phenomenon” to each ob-
server independently. This description of physical reality,
though fundamentally fragmented, is assumed in RQM to
be the best possible one, i.e. to be complete [6]:
“Quantum mechanics is a theory about the phys-
ical description of physical systems relative to
other systems, and this is a complete description
of the world”.
2.1 RQM and Physical Reality
In the context of the EPR debate, realism is taken as the
assumption that, in Einstein’s words [24],
1We refer the reader puzzled by these philosophical implications
to [6], where the position of RQM in the landscape of current views
on quantum theory is discussed in detail. See also the discussion in
Section 5.6 of [18].
“there exists a physical reality independent of
substantiation and perception”.
We call this assumption “Einstein’s realism”.2 RQM de-
parts from such strict realism. In RQM, physical reality
is taken to be formed by the individual quantum events
(facts3) through which interacting systems (objects4) af-
fect one another. Quantum events are therefore assumed
to exist only in interactions5 and (this is the central point)
the character of each quantum event is only relative to the
system involved in the interaction. In particular, which
properties any given system S has is only relative to a
physical system A that interacts with S and is affected by
these properties.
If A can keep track of the sequence of her past inter-
actions with S, then A has information about S, in the
sense that S and A’s degrees of freedom are correlated.
According to RQM, this relational information exhausts
the content of any observer’s description of the physical
world.
Michel Bitbol proposes to qualify this approach as a
meta-description [10]: RQM is the set of rules specifying
the form of any such physical description. In that sense,
RQM is faithful to Bohr’s epistemological position, as pre-
sented for instance in [27]:
“It is wrong to think that the task of physics is
to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what
we can say about nature.”
Still, RQM adds an essential twist to this position of Bohr.
For Bohr, the “we” that can say something about na-
ture is a preferred macroscopic classical apparatus that
escapes the laws of quantum theory: facts, namely results
of quantum measurements, are produced interacting with
this classical observer. In RQM, the preferred observer
is abandoned. Indeed, it is a fundamental assumption of
this approach that nothing distinguishes a priori systems
and observers: any physical system provides a potential
observer. Physics concerns what can be said about na-
ture on the basis of the information that any physical
system can, in principle, have. The preferred Copenhagen
observer is relativized into the multiplicity of observers,
formed by all possible physical systems, and therefore it
no longer escapes the laws of quantum mechanics6.
2This simplistic definition does not do justice to Einstein’s subtle
position concerning physical reality, which is far more instrumen-
tal and programmatic than metaphysical: see [25] for an insightful
analysis. We use this definition here it for the sake of the discussion.
3 “1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things” [26].
4 “2.01 An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities,
things). 2.011 It is essential to a thing that it can be a constituent
part of an atomic fact” [26].
5 “2.0121 There is no object that we can imagine excluded from
the possibility of combining with others” [26].
6An observer, in the sense used here, does not need to be, say
“complex”, or even less so “conscious”. An atom interacting with
another atom can be considered an observer. Obviously this does
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Different observers can of course exchange information.
However, this exchange is itself a quantum mechanical in-
teraction. An exchange of information is a quantum mea-
surement performed by one observing system A upon an-
other observing system B. As we shall see, it is the disre-
gard of this fact of nature that creates the illusion of the
EPR non-locality.
2.2 The Physical Meaning of ψ
The existence in regularities in natural phenomena, that
is, laws of nature, means that we can predict future events
on the basis of past events. More precisely, the outcome
of future interactions of an “observing” system A with an
observed system S can be predicted on the basis of the
information acquired via past interactions. The tool for
doing this is the quantum state ψ of S.
The state ψ that we associate with a system S is there-
fore, first of all, just a coding of the outcome of these
previous interactions with S. Since these are actual only
with respect to A, the state ψ is only relative to A: ψ is
the coding of the information that A has about S. Because
of this irreducible epistemic character, ψ is but a relative
state, which cannot be taken to be an objective property
of the single system S, independent from A. Every state
of quantum theory is a relative state.7
On the other hand, the state ψ is a tool that can be used
by A to predict future outcomes of interactions between S
and A. In general these predictions depend on the time t
at which the interaction will take place. In the Schro¨dinger
picture this time dependence is coded into a time evolution
of the state ψ itself. In this picture, there are therefore two
distinct manners in which ψ can evolve: (i) in a discrete
way, when S and A interact, in order for the information
to be adjusted, and (ii) in a continuous way, to reflect the
time dependence of the probabilistic relation between past
and future events.
From the relational perspective the Heisenberg picture
appears far more natural: ψ codes the information that
can be extracted from past interactions and has no explicit
dependence on time; it is adjusted only as a result of an
interaction, namely as a result of a new quantum event rel-
ative to the observer. If physical reality is the set of these
bipartite interactions, and nothing else, our description of
dynamics by means of relative states should better mirror
this fact: discrete changes of the relative state, when infor-
mation is updated, and nothing else. What evolves with
time are the operators, whose expectation values code the
not mean that one atom must be capable of storing the information
about the other atom, and consciously computing the outcome of
its future interaction with it; the point is simply that the history
of its past interaction is is principle sufficient information for this
computation.
7From this perspective, probability needs clearly to be interpreted
subjectively. On a Bayesian approach to QM, see [20, 28]; for a more
general defense of Bayesian probabilities in science, and a discussion
of the relevance of this point for the EPR debate, see [21].
time-dependent probabilities that can be computed on the
basis of the past quantum events.8
To summarize, two distinct aspects of physical infor-
mation, epistemic and predictive, are subsumed under the
notion of (relative) quantum state; amending Bohr’s epis-
temology, we can say that QM is the theory of logical
relations between the two.
2.3 Locality
We call locality the principle demanding that two spatially
separated events cannot have instantaneous mutual influ-
ence. We will argue that this is not contradicted by EPR-
type correlations, if we take the relational perspective on
quantum mechanics.
Locality is at the very roots of RQM, in the observation
that different observers (in general distant from one an-
other) can have different descriptions of the same system.
As emphasized by Einstein, it is locality that makes
possible the individuation of physical systems, including
those we call observers9. From the RQM perspective, this
observation amounts to acknowledging the relative char-
acter of actuality. Indeed, recall that a property of S is
actual relative to A only if substantialized in a correlation
between A and S. This (epistemic) correlation is always
constrained by the speed of light, so that distant observers
are bound to have different information on a given system:
they do not describe reality univocally.
An indication of this fact is in the well-known difficulty
of describing and interpreting the relativistic transforma-
tion law of the wave function, when measurements involve
observers in relative motion [29].
Even beyond its foundational role in relativistic field
theories, locality constitutes, therefore, the base of the
relational methodology: an observer cannot, and must
not, account for events involving systems located out of
its causal neighborhood (or light-cone).10
These remarks lead us to the following reformulation of
the locality principle, in which the relational perspective
is made explicit: relative to a given observer, two spatially
8This was also Dirac’s opinion: in the first edition of his cele-
brated book on quantum mechanics, Dirac uses Heisenberg states
(he calls them relativistic) [30]. In later editions, he switches to
Schro¨dinger states, explaining in the preface that it is easier to cal-
culate with these, but it is “a pity” to give up Heisenberg states,
which are more fundamental. In what was perhaps his last public
seminar, in Sicily, Dirac used a single transparency, with just one
sentence: “The Heisenberg picture is the right one”.
9“Without the assumption of the mutually independent existence
(the ‘being-thus’) of spatially distant things, an assumption which
originates in everyday thought, physical thought in the sense familiar
to us would not be possible. Nor one does can see how physical laws
could be formulated and tested without such a clean separation.”
Quoted in [31], where this point is discussed in depth.
10We can take this observation as an echo in fundamental physics
of the celebrated: “7. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must
be silent” [26].
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separated events cannot have instantaneous mutual influ-
ence.
The idea that locality imposes a relativization in the de-
scription of reality is certainly not new: it is precisely the
physical content of special relativity. When we say that
simultaneity is relative, we mean that distant observers
cannot take note of a given event instantaneously, and
thus ascribe it the same time as their own. The meaning
of the adjective “relative” in the RQM notion of “relative
state” is therefore very similar to the meaning of “relative”
in special relativity. It is the translation of the impossibil-
ity of principle to transmit information faster than light
—and without a physical interaction. To stress the anal-
ogy, we can say that the conceptual difficulties raised by
the interpretation of the Lorentz transformations before
1905 came from the lack of appreciation of the epistemic
nature of simultaneity.
2.4 Separability
Another concept playing an important role in the EPR
discussions is separability. An option that saves a (weak-
ened) form of locality is, according to some, to assume
that entangled quantum objects are “not-separable”. As-
pect, for instance, teaches that “a pair of twin entangled
photons must in fact be regarded as a single, inseparable
system, described by a global quantum state” [32]. If this
is just a restatement of the existence of correlations, and
the consequent impossibility of assigning well-defined in-
dependent states to the photons, this is unquestionable.
But if this is meant to provide an ontologically satisfac-
tory explanation of the mysterious EPR correlations, then
it clearly misses its point, since experiments do perform
measurements on distinct photons. In fact, this rather
strange notion, where two physical entities are actually a
single system, indicates, in our opinion, the difficulty to
reconcile realism, locality and quantum theory. We argue
below that the abandonment of Einstein’s strict realism
allows one to exempt himself from this type of intellectual
acrobatics.
Let us instead choose the following definition of sepa-
rability: two physical systems S1 and S2 are separable if
there exists a complete set of observables (in the sense of
Dirac) of the compound system S1 + S2 whose values can
be actualized by measurements on S1 or S2 only. Such
observables are called individual observables; the others
are called collective observables.
This notion of separability is equivalent to a minimal
operational definition of subsystems of a composite sys-
tem. It is deliberately weak (and in the end trivial); any
stronger definition testifies to some unnecessary unease.
3 The EPR argument
Let us start from Einstein’s formulation11 of the EPR ar-
gument, and then analyze its later evolutions.
3.1 Reminder of the Experiment (in
Bohm’s setting)
Consider a radioactive decay, producing two spin-half par-
ticles, and call them α and β. Suppose that some previous
measurement ensures that the square of the total spin of
the two particles equals zero —which corresponds, in the
spectroscopic vocabulary, to the singlet state. The parti-
cles α and β leave the source in two different directions,
reaching two distant detectors A and B, which measure
their spin in given directions.
3.2 Einstein’s Version of the EPR Argu-
ment
According to standard QM, the measurement of an ob-
servable provokes the projection of the system’s state onto
the eigenspace associated with the obtained eigenvalue. In
the case of the singlet, the state can be equivalently de-
composed on the eigenbasis of the spin in two different
directions, say z and x:
|ψsinglet〉 = 1√
2
(
|↓〉α |↑〉β − |↑〉α |↓〉β
)
=
1√
2
(
|→〉α |←〉β − |←〉α |→〉β
)
. (1)
Depending on whether the observerAmeasures the spin of
α in the direction z or x, the second particle β finds itself
in an eigenstate of Sz or Sx. In either case, the property
of having a definite spin in one direction is uniquely deter-
mined for β, hence is real, since, according to Einstein’s
realism,
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we
can predict with certainty the value of a physical
quantity, then there exists an element of physi-
cal reality corresponding to this physical quantity.
[13]
But according to the principle of locality, the choice made
by A cannot have an influence on β, which is space-like
separated from A. Therefore, in order to accommodate
both possibilities it is necessary for the spin in both di-
rections to be uniquely determined. But this is more
physical information than the one contained in a vector
in the Hilbert space of the states of β. Hence there ex-
ist real properties not described by quantum mechanics.
Completeness of quantum mechanics, namely one-to-one
11For a detailed discussion of Einstein’s position on the question of
locality, appreciably different from the one presented in the original
EPR article, see [31, 25] and below.
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correspondence between the mathematical objects used to
describe the state of a system and its real state, is dis-
proved.
3.3 The Question of Locality
Einstein and his collaborators in the EPR paper had no
reasons whatsoever to question locality, or realism. The
first was one of the pillars of Einstein’s major achieve-
ments. The second was a philosophical assumption to
which science was obviously immensely indebted.
But Bell’s work showed that the simplest interpretation
of EPR correlations as an indication that quantum me-
chanics is incomplete was not tenable: any hypothetical
complete classical dynamics yielding the same correlations
as quantum mechanics violates locality. If the quantum
predictions are correct, then a realistic local theory seems
impossible.
Of course, the possibility was still open that QM was
simply not yielding the correct physical predictions. But
this last possibility has been ruled out by the experimental
work of Aspect et al, leaving, it seems, only two possible
interpretations of the EPR correlations: either as a man-
ifestation of non-locality, as commonly assumed, or, as a
challenge to strong realism. It is this second possibility,
we argue here, which is made concrete by RQM.
3.4 Relational Critique
Einstein’s argument relies on the strongly realistic hypoth-
esis that the actual properties of the particles (the “real
state of affairs”) revealed by the detectors are observer-
independent. It is this hypothesis that justifies the ascrip-
tion of a definite, objective, state to each particle, at every
instant of the experiment: in Einstein’s account, when B
measures the spin of β, the measured value instantaneously
acquires an objective existence also relative to A.
This hypothesis, namely that when B measures the spin
of β, the measured value instantaneously acquires an ob-
jective existence that can be considered absolute, is com-
mon to all the analyses that lead to an interpretation of
the EPR correlations as a manifestation of non-locality
[4, 5].
But this hypothesis is not operationally justified: noth-
ing enables A to know the outcome of the measure carried
out by B on β, unless Ameasures the state of B. A cannot
measure the state of B instantaneously, precisely because
of locality: B is far away.
From the relational perspective, what is missing in Ein-
stein’s quotation above, as well as in all later analyses
of the EPR correlations, is the distinction between “ele-
ments of physical reality” (quantum events) relative to A
and “elements of physical reality” relative to B.
Observer A can of course measure the state of B (or,
for that matter, β), but only when A is back into causal
contact with B [14]. This is, needless to say, in the fu-
ture light-cone of A, and therefore poses no challenge for
locality. In other words, Einstein’s reasoning requires the
existence of a hypothetical super-observer that can instan-
taneously measure the state of A and B. It is the hypo-
thetical existence of such nonlocal super-being, and not
QM, that violates locality.
Let us look at the origin of the illusion of non-locality
more in detail. Suppose that A measures a spin compo-
nent of α at time t0, and B measures a spin component
of β at time t′0. Einstein’s ingenious counterfactual argu-
ment works under the assumption that locality prevents
any causal influence ofA’s measurement on B’s (A’s choice
of measuring the spin along z or along x cannot affect the
B measurement, hence we can counterfactually join the
consequences of the two alternatives). But for such coun-
terfactuality to be effective, there has to exist an objective
“element of reality” which is unaffected by A’s actions. If
one acknowledges that B’s state of affairs is a priori unde-
fined for A, then bringing B into the argument is useless,
because then what would be actualized by A’s measure-
ment of the spin of α along one direction would be relative
to A only. In fact, Einstein implicitly assumes that B is a
classical system, recording objective values in its “pointer
variables”. That is, even if A can’t see the position of B’s
pointer variables before a later time t1, this position has
nevertheless a determined position since t′0
12. Thus, the
properties of β become actual when it interacts with B at
time t′0, indeed substantiating the non-local EPR correla-
tions between distant locations. Thus, it is the assumption
that B is classical and fails to obey quantum theory that
creates EPR non-locality.
But all systems are quantum: there are no intrinsically
classical systems. Hence the hypothesis that B does not
obey quantum theory is physically incorrect. It is this
mistaken hypothesis that causes the apparent violation of
locality.
In other words, in the sequence of events which is real
for A there is no definite quantum event regarding β at
time t0, and therefore no element of reality generated non-
locally at time t0 in the location where B is. Hence Ein-
stein’s argument cannot even begin to be formulated.
What changes instantaneously at time t0, for A, is not
the objective state of β, but only its (subjective) relative
state, that codes the information that A has about β. This
change is unproblematic, for the same reason for which
my information about China changes discontinuously any
time I read an article about China in the newspaper. Rel-
ative to A, β is not affected by this change because there
is no β-event happening at time t0. The meaning of the
sudden change in the state of β is that, as a consequence of
her measurement on α, A can predict outcomes of future
measurement that A herself might do on β, or on B.
12A similar implicit hypothesis, the “retrodiction principle”, was
pointed out by Bitbol in [19].
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Of course the price to pay for this solution of the puzzle
is that the sequence of events as described by B is different
from what it is as described by A. For B, there is a
quantum event of β at time t′0 and there is no quantum
event regarding α at time t′0. But the core assumption of
RQM is that quantum events relative to distinct observers
cannot be simply juxtaposed.
Finally, let us add one remark on the later arguments
supporting the idea of non-locality in QM [4, 5]. Some of
these works are based on a weaker form of realism than the
one of Einstein or Bell. However, they all still maintain
the assumption that there is an objective element of reality
in the simultaneous realization of the measurements of α
and β at space-like separated locations. For instance, in its
second premise, Stapp demands that “experimental out-
comes that have already occurred in an earlier region [...]
can be considered to be fixed and settled independently
from which experiment will be chosen and performed later
in a region space-like separated from the first.” [5] This is
precisely the assumption questioned in RQM.
4 Relational discussion of the EPR
experiment
We shall now present a relational discussion of the EPR
experiment, compatible with locality. But first, let us get
rid of the problem of separability: in the EPR experiment,
the two entangled systems interact with two different ob-
servers. Incontestably, both get definite outcomes dur-
ing these complete measurements (in the sense of Dirac).
Hence, the particles are separable. Fine - one might say -
but what about the EPR correlations?
4.1 Individual Measurements
Say that A measures the spin of α in the direction n at
time t0. This is an individual observable, denoted S
n
Aα.
Suppose B measures the spin of β in the direction n′ at
time t
′
0 (individual observable S
n′
Bβ). Let us denote ǫAα
and ǫBβ (ǫ = ±1) the corresponding outcomes. Because
A and B are space-like separated, there cannot exist an
observer with respect to which both of these outcomes are
actual, and therefore it is meaningless to compare ǫAα and
ǫBβ : A’s outcome is fully independent from B’s, and vice
versa.
4.2 EPR Correlations
But these individual measures do not exhaust all possibil-
ities. In the EPR experiment, the composite system α+β
is assumed to be in the singlet state. From the relational
point of view, this means that some observer, say A her-
self, has the information that the total spin of α+β equals
zero. That is, it has interacted with the composite system
in the past and has measured the square of the total spin.
Let us call this collective observable S2A,α+β.
The measurement of SnAα brings new information to A.
It determines the change of the relative state of α. Notice
that A’s knowledge about α changes (epistemic aspect),
and, at the same time, A’ predictions concerning future
change (predictive aspect). For instance, A becomes able
to predict with certainty the value of SnAα if the interaction
is repeated.
But there is another observable whose value QM enables
A to predict: Sn
′
Aβ , namely the measurement that A can
perform on β at the time t1, when β is back into causal
contact with A. For instance, if
S2A,α+β = 0 and S
n
Aα = ǫ, (2)
then QM predicts
SnAβ = −ǫ. (3)
That is, the knowledge of the value of the collective observ-
able S2α+β plus the knowledge of the individual observable
SnAα permit to predict the future outcome of the individual
observable SnAβ: it is this type of inference which consti-
tutes the “EPR correlations”. It concerns a sequence of
causally connected interactions.
4.3 Consistency
Let us bring B back into the picture. It is far from the
spirit of RQM to assume that each observer has a “solip-
sistic” picture of reality, disconnected from the picture of
all the other observers. In fact, the very reason we can do
science is because of the consistency we find in nature: if
I see an elephant and I ask you what you see, I expect you
to tell me that you too see an elephant. If not, something
is wrong.
But, as claimed above, any such conversation about ele-
phants is ultimately an interaction between quantum sys-
tems. This fact may be irrelevant in everyday life, but
disregarding it may give rise to subtle confusions, such as
the one leading to the conclusion of non-local EPR influ-
ences.
In the EPR situation, A and B can be considered two
distinct observers, both making measurements on α and β.
The comparison of the results of their measurements, we
have argued, cannot be instantaneous, that is, it requires
A and B to be in causal contact. More importantly, with
respect to A, B is to be considered as a normal quantum
system (and, of course, with respect to B, A is a normal
quantum system). So, what happens if A and B compare
notes? Have they seen the same elephant?
It is one of the most remarkable features of quantum me-
chanics that indeed it automatically guarantees precisely
the kind of consistency that we see in nature [6]. Let us
illustrate this assuming that both A and B measure the
spin in the same direction, say z, that is n = n′ = z.
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Since B is a quantum system, there will be an observ-
able SnAB corresponding to B’s answer (at time t1) to the
question “which value of the spin have you measured?”.
That is, SnAB is the observable describing the pointer vari-
able in the detector B. Then consistency demands that:
(i) If A measures SnAB after having measured S
n
Aβ , she
will get
SnAB = S
n
Aβ. (4)
(ii) If a third observer C, who has the prior information
that measurements have been performed byA andB, mea-
sures at a later time the two pointer variables: SnCA and
SnCB then
SnCB = −SnCA. (5)
But this follows from standard QM formalism, because
an interaction between β and B that can be interpreted
as a measurement is an interaction such that the state (1)
and the initial state of α, β and B evolve into the state
(relative to A)
|ψ〉(A)α+β+B =
1√
2
(
|↓〉α |↑〉β |↑〉B − |↑〉α |↓〉β |↓〉B
)
(6)
with obvious notation. Tracing out the state of α that
plays no role here, we get the density matrix
ρ
(A)
β+B =
1
2
(
|↑〉β |↑〉B 〈↑|β 〈↑|B + |↓〉β |↓〉B 〈↓|β 〈↓|B
)
. (7)
from which (4) follows immediately. Similarly, the state
of the ensemble of the four systems α, β,A,B, relative to
C evolves, after the two interactions at time t0 into the
state
|ψ〉(C)α+β+A+B =
1√
2
(
|↓〉α |↑〉β |↓〉A |↑〉B−|↑〉α |↓〉β |↑〉A |↓〉B
)
(8)
again with obvious notation. Tracing out the state of α
and β, we get the density matrix
ρ
(C)
A+B =
1
2
(
|↓〉A |↑〉B 〈↓|A 〈↑|B+|↓〉A |↑〉B 〈↓|A 〈↑|B
)
. (9)
which gives (5) immediately. (For a similar argument, see
[33].) It is clear that everybody sees the same elephant.
More precisely: everybody hears everybody else stating
that they see the same elephant they see. This, after all,
is a sound definition of objectivity.
4.4 An Objection
An instinctive objection to the RQM account of the above
situation is the following. Suppose that at a certain time
the following happens
(⋆) A observes the spin in a given direction
to be ↑ and B observes the spin in the same di-
rection to be also ↑.
Agreement with quantum theory demands that when later
interacting with B, A will necessarily finds B’s pointer
variable indicating that the measured spin was ↓ . This
implies that what Ameasures about B’s information (↓) is
unrelated to what B has actually measured (↑). The con-
clusion appears to be that each observer sees a completely
different world, unrelated to what any other observer sees:
A sees an elephant and hears B telling her about an ele-
phant, even if B has seen a zebra. Can this happen in the
conceptual framework of RQM?
The answer is no. The reason is subtle and lies at the
core of RQM.
The founding postulate of RQM stipulates that we shall
not deal with properties of systems in the abstract, but
only of properties of systems relative to one system. In
particular, we can never juxtapose properties relative to
different systems. If we do so, we make the same mistake
as when we simultaneously ascribe position and momen-
tum to a particle. In other words, RQM is not the claim
that reality is described by the collection of all properties
relative to all systems. This collection is assumed not to
make sense. Rather, reality admits one description per
(observing) system, each being internally consistent.
In turn, any given system can be observed by another
system. RQM is, in a sense, the stipulation that we shall
not talk about anything else than that, and the obser-
vation that this scheme is sufficient for describing nature
and our own possibility of exchanging information about
nature (hence circumventing solipsism).
So, the case (⋆) can never happen, because it does not
happen either with respect to A or with respect to B. The
two sequences of events (the one with respect to A and the
one with respect to B) are distinct accounts of the same
reality that cannot and should not be juxtaposed. The
weakening of realism is the abandonment of the unique ac-
count of a sequence of the events, and its replacement with
compatible alternatives, not with a self-consistent collec-
tion of all relative properties.
Once more, this does not mean that B and A cannot
communicate their experience. In fact, in either account
the possibility of communicating experiences exists and
in either account consistency is ensured. Contradiction
emerges only if, against the main stipulation of RQM, we
insist on believing that there is an absolute, external ac-
count of the state of affairs in the world, obtained by jux-
taposing actualities relative to different observers.
5 Comparison with Laudisa’s dis-
cussion of relational EPR
The EPR argument has been discussed in the context of
RQM also by Federico Laudisa, in a recent paper [34].
Laudisa’s discussion has some points in common with the
one given here, but it differs from the present one in one
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key respect.
Laudisa starts with a reformulation of the EPR hy-
potheses, namely realism, locality and completeness of
QM, in a form meant to be compatible with RQM. The
locality principle, in particular, is given the following for-
mulation: No property of a physical system S that is ob-
jective relative to some observer can be influenced by mea-
surements performed in space-like separated regions on a
different physical system. He is then able to show that the
contradiction between locality, formulated in this manner,
and QM is itself relative, in the sense that it is frame-
dependent: there is always an observer (in the sense of
special relativity) for which it is inexistent.
5.1 Laudisa’s Argument
Here goes Laudisa’s argument: after the measurement of
the spin of α (say in the direction z) by A, the spin of
β (in the same direction z) has a determined value rela-
tive to A. However, according to the (relativized) locality
principle, β cannot acquire a property relative to A as
a consequence of the measure performed on α. Hence,
relative to A, the spin of β already had a determined
value before the measurement. This fact is in contradic-
tion with the prior state of the compound system relative
to A, |ψ〉(A)α+β = 1√2 (|↓〉α |↑〉β − |↑〉α |↓〉β), which leads to
the improper mixture representing the state of β relative
to A: ρ
(A)
β =
1
2 (|↑〉β 〈↑|β+ |↓〉β 〈↓|β). At that point, Laud-
isa remarks that, because of space-like separation between
A and B, one can find a reference frame in which A’s mea-
surement precedes B’s. In such a frame, when A faces the
locality/completeness contradiction, B has not performed
any measurement yet, and therefore escapes the contradic-
tion. What is more, there exists another reference frame
in which the chronology of measurements is inverted, so
that the contradiction afflicts B but not A. Finally, the
EPR contradiction turns out to be frame-dependent, and
thus fails to refute the locality principle in an absolute
sense.
5.2 Comparison
Laudisa’s interpretation is based on the same premise –
relativity of quantum states–, but differs from the one
presented here. Unlike Laudisa, we do not understand
locality as prohibiting the acquisition of information by
an observer on a distant system, but only as prohibiting
the possibility that a measurement performed in a region
could, in any way, affect the outcomes of a measurement
happening in a distant region. In the EPR scenario we
have discussed, the state of β relative to B is indepen-
dent of A’s measurement, but not the state of β relative
to A. Since the existence of correlations between α and β
is know a priori by A, the measurement of an individual
observable of α does permit the prediction of the value of
an individual observable of β. What is affected by this
measurement is not a hypothetical absolute physical state
of β, but just A’s knowledge about β. It is B’s knowledge
(or direct experience) about β that cannot be affected by
anything performed by A.
Laudisa’s residual frame–dependent contradiction be-
tween locality and completeness results from an interpre-
tation of locality which disregards the epistemic aspect
of relative states. More radical, our conclusion here is
that there is no contradiction at all between locality and
completeness, nor, more generally, locality and QM pre-
dictions.
6 Conclusion
We have argued that within the relational framework the
EPR-type correlations predicted by QM do not violate
locality. In fact, the relation between locality and QM
is more than the “peaceful coexistence” which is often
declared: rather, from the relational perspective, QM is
rooted in locality in a way which, although it dismisses
Einstein’s strict realism (the “real, objective state of af-
fairs”), certainly corroborates QM’s claim to be a funda-
mental theory.
Needless to say, the weakening of realism implied by
RQM may be considered too high a price to pay by some.
(This view is strongly argued, for instance, in the recent
[35].) Our opinion, instead, is that after almost a cen-
tury of substantial failure, it may be worthwhile to try
some bold philosophical step, expanding the original mo-
tivations of Heisenberg and Bohr, in order to make full
sense of quantum mechanics.
Einstein’s original motivation with EPR was not to
question locality, but rather to question the completeness
of QM, on the basis of a firm confidence in locality. The
EPR argument has then been turned upside down, and
has been perceived as evidence for non-locality (in fact, a
peculiar form of non–locality) in QM, independently from
the issue of completeness: after Bell, indeed, it is gen-
erally assumed that even a hidden variable theory that
completes QM must be non-local. RQM is complete in
the sense of exhausting everything that can be said about
nature. However, in a sense RQM can be interpreted as
the discovery of the incompleteness of the description of
reality that any single observer can give: A can measure
the pointer variable of B, but the set of the events as de-
scribed B is irreducibly distinct from the set of events as
described by A. In this particular sense, RQM can be said
to show the “incompleteness” of single–observer Copen-
hagen QM. Then Einstein’s intuition that the EPR cor-
relations reveal something deeply missing in Copenhagen
quantum mechanics can be understood as being correct:
The incompleteness of Copenhagen QM is the disregard
of the quantum properties of all observers, which leads to
paradoxes as the apparent violation of locality exposed by
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EPR.
This recalls the conclusion that the late Prof. Peres
reached in his analysis of EPR in 2004: “The question
raised by EPR ‘Can the quantum–mechanical description
of physical reality be considered complete?’ has a positive
answer. However, reality may be different for different
observers” [23]. This is the idea at the basis of RQM.
—————–
We are grateful to Bas van Fraassen and Alexei Grin-
baum for useful comments and suggestions, and to Daniel
R.Terno for bringing reference [23] to our attention. CR
would like to dedicate this article to the memory of Oreste
Piccioni.
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